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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
THE APPLICATION OF THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT TO MATRIMONIAL
ACTION.-That the remedy afforded by a declaratory order is gradually
being recognized as of great utility is evidenced by a recent decision of
'he Appellate Division in the first department.' In that case plaintiff
sought a declaration that she was the wife of defendant; that the
divorce he secured in Mexico was of no effect in law; and that his
alleged second marriage was a nullity. The further relief prayed for, with
which this paper will not concern itself, was the enjoining the husband
from, cohabiting with his second wife and that such alleged second
wife be enjoined from using his name. Before we consider the conclu-
sions there made it would be consonant with a proper understanding of
the subject to briefly relate the nature and purpose of declaratory
judgments.
Courts at common law were created to redress private wrongs and
punish the commission of crimes. Tribunals then took no interest unless
one person actually wronged another. Not only law courts but courts of
equitable jurisdiction did not assume to exercise their broad powers
unless an actual controversy arose concerning the infringement of the
rights of parties. In 1852 for the first time the courts of England were
empowered to grant relief declaratory in nature in addition to their
powers to award corrective or coercive relief.2 In the United States,
it was not until Prof. Borchard in a series of brilliant articles 3 brought
the attention of jurists and legislators to the true value of declaratory
judgments that statutes to that effect were passed in various states. The
progress of this form of relief was dealt a severe blow when a statute
similar to that passed in England was declared unconstitutional in
Michigan. The court in its interpretation (which has been subjected to
considerable criticism) 4 contended that an application to the courts for
advice in matters as to which controversies have not arisen presents all
the objectionable characteristics of a moot case and as such was a
I Baumann v. Baumann, 222 App. Div. 460 (1928).
2 15 and 16 Vict., ch. 86: "No suit in the said court shall be open to objec-
tion on the ground that a merely declaratory decree or order is sought thereby,
and it shall be lawful for the court to make binding declarations of right
without granting consequential relief."
1"The Declaratory Judgment-A Needed Procedural Reform." 28
Yale L. J. 1.
4 "Several of the leading law journals which have assumed the important
function of examining critically the decisions of the courts from the stand-
point of their adherence to law and principle, have been unanimous in con-
demning the Michigan decision as devoid of foundation in law or reason." 34
Harv. L. Rev. 716; see also 19 Mich. L. Rev. 86, 30 Yale L. J. 161.
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conferment of non-judicial powers.5 Notwithstanding, the New York
legislature enacted section 473 of the Civil Practice Act.,6 authorizing the
issuance of declaratory orders.
The Baumann case presents for the first time in this state a decisive
determination of the question whether matrimonial actions are within
the provisions relative to declaratory judgments. The contentions raised
against such extension were twofold; first, that in view of the fact that
matrimonial actions are entirely statutory and that since the sections
applicable thereto are so detailed in their provisions it would be but
proper to conclude that they are all-embracing and exclusive of every
other form of remedy; second, that the section relating to annulments7
in itself provides a nore complete remedy and one more effective in
determining the rights of all concerned.
The first argument can be very quickly disposed of when we appre-
ciate that the Supreme Court at all times before and after the passage
of either the sections relating to matrimonial actions or those relating
to declaratory orders has -had the power to determine the validity of a
marriage as incident to ejectment actions or in claims for priority in
letters of administration. In other countries by judicial decision the
mere existence of other forms of relief does not preclude the application
for a declaratory judgment." To narrow the provisions of this benefi-
cent remedy would be in effect to defeat its very purpose. This the court
perceived when it stated "The language of section 473 is general and
all-embracing. * * * We think the action for declaratory judgment for
the relief sought for by the plaintiff is permissible and the provisions of
articles 67-70 of the Civil Practice Act, at most, furnish alternative
remedies." 9
5 Anway v. Grand Rapids R. Co., 211 Mich. 592, 179 N. W. 350; 12 A. L.
R. 26 (1920).
6 "The Supreme Court shall have power in any action or proceeding to
declare rights and other legal relations on request for such whether or not
further relief is or could be claimed, and such declarations shall have the
force of a final judgment. Such provisions shall be made by rules as may be
necessary and proper to carry into effect the provisions of this section." C. P. A.
473. See also Rules of C. P. 210-214.
7 "An action to annul a marriage upon the ground that the former husband
or wife of one of the parties was living, the former marriage being in force,
may be maintained by either of the parties during the lifetime of the other,
or by the former husband or wife." N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1134.
8 "The mere fact that another remedy exists is no ground at all of itself
for refusing the declaration. The English and Colonial courts regard the
declaratory relief as an alternative remedy." 36 Yale L. J. 403.
9 Supra note 1.
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To say that an action for annulment or divorce is a more complete
remedy is to fail to appreciate the differing results. In the principal
case a mere decree of annulment would not mention the Mexican judg-
ment. It is this divorce secured by fraud that the plaintiff seeks to have
declared a nullity. Consequently, since there is no statutory action to
annul a divorce the proper remedy would seem to be a declaration to
that effect. That divorce on the recoirds and a public representation
thereof is humiliating and degrading both to the plaintiff and her
children. For might it not be inferred, as it generally is, that a divorce
is secured through the defendant's misconduct? Again, assuming that
plaintiff obtained an annulment of the second marriage that would not
prevent the defendant from remarrying in another state and asserting
the validity of the divorce secured by fraud in Mexico.
Both in the United States and England there are numerous author-
ities sustaining the extension of declaratory orders into the realm of
matrimonial actions.' 0 In a few states there are specific statutes granting
this form of relief in declaring and determining a marriage status.11
Courts have even gone so far as to declare such status where actually no
divorce or annulment was sought. 2- Then too, in order to avoid future
complication, such as controversies over property rights and legitimacy,
the courts have interferred to remove whatever cloud there may be upon
a marriage contract. 1
3
It was argued that if courts are empowered merely to determine
the status of parties to a marital agreement a congested calendar will
ensue. That apprehension is not well founded. The same argument
was made against the enactment of the provisions relating to declaratory
orders and is always made when new legislation is proposed. In point
of fact although section 473 has now been in effect since May, 1921,
the reported decisions under the section have not exceeded thirty.
"British and continental practice has demonstrated that the courts
have not exhausted their usefulness by the employment of their curative
functions, but that there remains a large field for the application of their
-, In re Phillips (1903). 1 Ch. 128. a declaratory judgment was entered
adjudicating a marital status; in Schilson v. Her Majesty's Attorney General
22, Weekly Reports 831; West -'. Lord Sackville (1903), 2 Ch. 378; Kitzman
v. Kitzman, 167 Wis. 308. 166 N. W. 789 (1918); Sharon v. Sharon, 67 Cal.
185, 7 Pac. 635 (1885).
11 Uniform Declaration Judgment Act. Laws of Wisconsin (1925), Chap-
ter 400, 247.03; Laws of California, C. C. P. Section 1050.
12 Greenberg v. Greenberg, 218 App. Div. 104, 218 N. Y. Supp. 87 (1926);
Dodge v. Campbell, 220 N. Y. Supp. 262 (1927).
13 Gargan v. Sculley. 82 Misc. 687. 144 N. Y. Supp. 205 (1913) ; Webster v.
Webster. N. Y L. J.. April 19, 1927; June 10, 1927.
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preventive functions which in this country has barely been touched.
Under the procedure authorizing declaratory judgments, with its sim-
plicity, its capacity to serve important ends of corrective justice without
legal hostilities, its utility in deciding many questions which cannot now
be brought before judicial cognizance, and its efficacy in removing
uncertainty from legal relations before it has ripened into a bitter
litigation, the American public may look forward to a more amicable and
simple method of adjusting many conflicts and to an enlarged social
service from its courts." 24
W. L.
24 34 Harv. L. Rev. 716.
